The purpose of the present text is to analyze the juridical phenomenon through the perspective of its rhetorical practice and to discuss whether such posture is by itself censorable from the ethical point of view. In order to achieve our purpose in this text, we have chosen to study, within the broad oeuvre of Aristotle, parts of the Organon collection, namely: Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and also Rhetoric and Poetics, with an emphasis on the Art of Rhetoric. The aim that governs this entire demarche is to understand the Aristotelian proposals to a theory of rationality, which is to be investigated through the discursive practices applied to the juridical phenomenon. The utility of rhetoric is thus emphasized to what concerns it as a technique of discourse analysis, not its power to dominate minds. The function of rhetoric is not only to persuade, but also to find the persuasion means that fit better each case, to recognize what seems to convince and what convinces indeed. Even though it may be dishonestly used, that does not diminish its value. Aristotle has freed rhetoric from the burden of moral. It is necessary to be capable of defending the pro as well as the contra, not to make them equivalent, but in order to understand the adversary mechanism of argumentation and, thus, refute it. Aristotle believes that the true and the just are by nature stronger than their contraries. This is also how juridical praxis works.
Formulation of our problem
The purpose of this text is to present and discuss the argumentative and rhetorical mechanisms present in juridical praxis, on the basis provided by Aristotelian Ethics. When we mention argumentative and rhetorical mechanisms, we intend to be in accordance with the perspective proposed by Aristotle while we approach and evaluate these possible forms of rationality, but we also focus on something the Macedonian philosopher did not develop, which is: to discuss the ethical condition of possibility of using rhetoric when the issue is law. We state that the meanders of dialectics, according to this thinker, have a lot in common with the life of courts, which use those discursive practices without being properly critical about the content of their own attitudes. We mean that law professionals even believe that their positions are a result of formal syllogisms, when it is not like that. What, in fact, they do is to use enthymematic syllogism, even when they are not aware that their actions are always rhetorical.
1 Juridical practice, due to reasons we shall expose, is essentially rhetorical. The purpose of rhetoric is to achieve persuasion within a factual case, whether criticizing of defending something, starting from specific circumstances and even taking profit of specific characteristics of the audience it addresses. For these reasons, persuasion, which is a fundamental quality of rhetoric, has been somehow stigmatized, although through a shallow kind of critics. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate that the function of rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is not only to persuade, but also to find the persuasion means that fit better each case, to recognize what seems to convince (Art of Rhetoric, 1355b, 10-15). Even though rhetoric may be dishonestly used, it tends to unveil its performative contradictions and, for that reason, it is an applicable mechanism of knowledge. Contrarily to Plato, Aristotle freed rhetoric from the burden of moral. Once it is an "art", rhetoric seems to be amoral to the Macedonian. Aristotle gives a more solid basis to rhetoric, by privileging not its power to dominate, but its capacity to explain, expose and demonstrate the fundaments underlying this or that thesis. According to the Aristotelian view, what must be done is to understand the mechanism of the adversary's argumentation, in order to refute it. Aristotle believes, after all, that truth and justice are by nature stronger than its contraries (Art of Rhetoric, 1355a, 37-38).
Aristotle believes in that because, according to him, logos is fourfold, comprising science, intelligence, wisdom and art, being rhetoric and dialectics the means by which all forms of rationality are constructed. However, there are a number of possible deformations within the unfolding of rationality, such as sophistic, eristic, lack of art and bad rhetoric. These rationality defects, as to say, might occur due to lack of preciseness and rigor, or even due to unfaithful intentions, but all of these vices can only be overcome by means of the same mechanism that creates them: argumentation itself. In other words, just as in biological science, the antidote has the same nature as poison: against bad argumentation, argumentation itself must be used. This is precisely the conclusion achieved by Enrico Berti, chiefly because "this is the typical attitude of he who is ready to give reason to what he affirms, thus establishing a communication with others and, therefore, submitting himself to evaluation and critical inspection made by others" 2 .
Indeed, we understand juridical rhetoric is the only mechanism that effectively vivifies the rationality of law, once it is connected to human subjectivity with its amount of wrong steps, incongruence and peculiarity. The "beings of sublunary world", in Aristotle's words, in order to construct their justice, possess tools which are merely probable, approximate, verisimilar and imperfect. Thus, only argumentation is capable of putting fragments back together, giving them form and usage. Certainly, there is no such thing as true premise when the law is at stake, but, after all, as Rohden affirms, "there are many ways of being rational or making rational speeches, but not all of them can be reduced to logical formulas or scientific and precise methods. Not all speeches are given the same level of rigor, conclusiveness and constringency, but all of them are valid, universalizable and communicable." In order to achieve the proposals of the present text, we have chosen to study, within the broad oeuvre of Aristotle, parts of the Organon collection, namely: Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and also Rhetoric and Poetics, with an emphasis on the Art of Rhetoric. The aim that governs this entire demarche is to understand the Aristotelian proposals to a theory of rationality, which is to be investigated through the discursive practices applied to the juridical phenomenon.
Introduction to the Aristotelian theory of rationality and what type of rationality corresponds to the law.
It is quite known that Aristotle does not deny the existence of a complete "truth", conceived as a knowledge derived from the rigor of science (episteme). However, science is not always a possibility. Then, wherever there is doubt (doxa), the argumentation upon what is preferable must be used. According to the philosopher, there are two worlds: the divine ethereal world, with necessary and therefore predictable and calculable movements; and the sublunary world, which is Earth, place of chance, contingency, unpredictability, open to human action, a place where a perfect science is impossible and only verisimilar and probable judgments are possible. While the first world is knowable by means of demonstrative reason, the second corresponds to the field of argumentation.
After having accepted Parmenides' thesis of dividing the areas of human knowledge into episteme and doxa, Aristotle claims that is a characteristic of man to search for precision, which is only possible, in each gender of thing, to the proportion admitted by the nature of the issue (Nicomachean Ethics, I 3, 1094b 24 and on; Metaphysics, II, 3, 995a 15). This is the reason why the art of defending oneself with argumentation is so important in situations in which demonstration is not possible. Aristotle finds rationality beyond analytical and demonstrative logics, and believes to be possible a logic of discussion and dialogue, a dialectic syllogistic ratiocination in order to satisfy the condition of confrontability, always obliged to communicate with the other person. This posture separates him from the convincement proposed by stoic philosophy, which believed that only episteme could be a source of knowledge; for the same reason, it isolates him from the cynic posture and places him contrarily to Platonism. Nonetheless, it does not align him with the sophists, because, in Aristotle's view, argumentation and rhetoric aim at the true knowledge, even though it takes their limitation into account. According to Ricoeur:
The great merit of Aristotle was in developing this link between the rhetorical concept of persuasion and the logical concept of the probable, and in constructing the whole edifice of a philosophy of rhetoric on this relationship. Thus, what we now read under the title of Rhetoric is a treatise containing the equilibrium between two opposed movements, one that inclines rhetoric to break away from philosophy, if not to replace it, and one that disposes philosophy to reinvent rhetoric as a system of second-order proofs. 4 .
In order to better understand Aristotle's plan we must recognize that his purpose distinguishes, in the field of dialectics, the good argumentation which leads to philosophical knowledge, from the bad argumentation which leads to eristic (vicious argumentation) or to sophism. Thus, sophism is like an apparent wisdom, without ballast, leading to an apparent persuasion; leading, in a word, to deceit. The law is configured the same manner; it may also be a victim of bad argumentation or eristic, but these vices are not necessarily part of it.
Dialectics and rhetoric are modes of rationalitiy that deal with what is merely acceptable, producing, therefore, a valid knowledge, once they use premises acceptable by common sense and reasonability. On the other hand, demonstrative logic, differently to argumentative and rhetoric, works with evidence in the field of certainty and produces answers through deduction from apodictic syllogism, because it departs from premises which are indemonstrable and counterfactually true. Among the forms of argumentative rationality, there are dialectics, which deal with what is acceptable in order to construct a thesis (thesis), and rhetoric, that functions in the field of contingence, influenced by the mood of the audience, and searches for persuasion. Such scheme is very useful to our purposes. We can perceive that the aim of demonstration is certainty, while in dialectics and rhetoric, what matters is, respectively, acceptability and cogency. Furthermore, demonstrative logic, as well as dialectics and rhetoric, are based upon premises. In formal logic, premises need to be evident (indemonstrable); in dialectics and rhetoric, premises can be acceptable or cogent for the audience, respectively.
The main discussion developed by Aristotle concerns methodology and is dedicated do comprehending the forms through which rationality is established. The different rationalities studied by Aristotle can be divided into demonstrative logic (I), dialectic rationality (II), rhetoric (III), eristic or sophistic (IV) and poetic (V). Law, in our view, is immersed in dialectic and rhetorical rationalities, but it uses poetic frequently.
Juridical praxis and its incompatibility with demonstrative rationality
The Aristotelian formal logic is exposed in the first books of Organon, called Analytics. These are the books in which Aristotle exposes his general conception of ratiocination through syllogism and sets the basis of formal logic. In these two books, Prior and Posterior Analytics, Aristotle does not directly approach an issue which would raise a great polemic in his works: the defense of argumentative thought as a manner of obtaining valid knowledge. This is a very original posture taken by Aristotle, because it is different from sophistic, it is not the acceptance of eristic: it is the admission of the limits of human rationality to what concerns knowing the truth in certain areas and, in spite of this admission, it sustains that human rationality is able to lead to valid knowledge.
Demonstrative rationality is the one in which there are no doubts (doxa), and its results are safe and true. The premises of scientific thought do not demand justification; they are evident; they come a priori and, therefore, are also indemonstrable. Let us see how Margutti describes the Aristotelian theory of demonstration:
Aristotle equalizes "knowledge" with "knowing by demonstration" and defines demonstration as being scientific syllogism (Post. An. I, 2, 71b, 16-18). Thus, science is equivalent to certain knowledge by the cause, a knowledge that is expressed in the syllogistic form. Therefore, previous knowledge is needed to function as departure points for syllogistic deduction. Such previous knowledge constitute the principles of science and are characterized for being absolutely true, prior and indemonstrable. Through the principles of science, we are capable of obtaining a knowledge of true enchainments based upon necessity. 6 In the field of formal science (episteme), principles or premises are considered to be indemonstrable or absolute, being, thus, unnecessary to question them. They would be captured by intuition, a faculty which belongs to the intellect (noûs) 7 . The whole structure of demonstration is based upon the model provided by geometry and arithmetic, and its axioms are taken as indubitable principles inside the very system it founds. This epistemological restriction is similar to the one made by Plato concerning dianoia. The field in which demonstration is applied is, to Aristotle, a relatively restricted one, because it must only be taken as valid.
As broadly exposed by the historiography of law, the arithmetic posture has been defended by the so-called "formalists of law" since the beginning of Modern Age, when we observe the ever-growing formalism of juridical practice, making it counterfactually deductible and unquestionable. This posture had been denounced with precocity by Vico, whom foresaw its dominant growth, once the Italian thinker was an enthusiast of rhetoric 8 . But juridical formalism grew indistinctly during the 17 th and 18 th centuries and achieved its utmost peak when the Exegetic School was expressive, confirming its methodological and systematic effects in the School of the Jurisprudence of Concepts (Thibaut and Puchta), arriving, already in the 20 th century, at the conception of purification of law, as verified in Kelsen and Hart.
However, this posture does not seem suitable to juridical thought because it departs from a lack of attention to the juridical phenomenon as a fact of culture. Or, still in Aristotelian words, law as a "sublunary" fact. The juridical world may even translate its results into syllogisms, but never into a formal syllogism, because there is no way of establishing unquestionable premises.
In order to better demonstrate our hypothesis, let us analyze the functioning of a formal logic problem, and then compare it to a juridical problem and its development. Once this is done, we take back theory and present our conclusion.
Still according to Aristotle, science is the field of knowledge in which apodictic, formal logic operates. This is so, because this world has indemonstrable premises which can be captured by intuition. And exactly because formal logic is able to depart from these a priori data and to make its premises from such data, it is capable of producing knowledge. Let us suppose, then, that we could understand this prior knowledge as non-discussible or simply valid rules. Well, the solution (if you have it, dear reader) can be obtained deductively, but there is no value involved. Once all premises are indemonstrably given a priori, they are only accepted without questioning. The whole demonstration structure is based upon the geometric or arithmetic model; its axioms are considered to be non-discussible and necessarily true principles, within the system it founds. They are, as to say, dogmas. When a system involving norms and dogmas is formed within law, we call it juridical dogmatic. Law has intensively proposed itself as dogmatic, bringing to itself an apologetic discourse of truth. Such an understanding has almost always revealed itself through the discourse of natural or rational law. It is not by chance that the world of science (episteme) is the one defined as natural (physis), and is characterized as ethereal and perfect. But there is something important to be observed about Aristotle when we analyze the prior and posterior analytics. It is necessary to recognize that, to Aristotle, the world of episteme is not necessarily metaphysical. It is in fact regulated by a priori commands, originated from indemonstrable causes. Science is the world of infallible rules, not necessarily metaphysical. But infallible does not necessarily means universal or supernatural, in Aristotle's perspective. Infallible is only indemonstrable and, thus, constitutes unconditional premises which demand a plan of apodictic rationality.
Well, human beings live in the Earth, in the sublunary world. This is the world of things that are left over, approximate, verisimilar, the world of enthymematic logic. This is the field of philosophy, where rationality derives from the dialectic of probability and contingency, thus constituting two fields: argumentative and rhetoric. In this matter, operations are made from topoi. A topos is an opinion accepted by all, or almost all, or at least by the wise ones (Topics, V). Dialectic is thus the art of arguing for and against. In the juridical field, there are some specific characteristics which can only be understood with dialectics. From now on, the effort of this text will be directed to demonstrate how dialectic-rhetoric thought translates itself into juridical thought. In law, we must, first of all, try to construct arguments from a short catalogue of previously disposed hypothesis. Each hypothesis -which may be understood here as a topos -may be, only maybe, used as a major premise. In the foreseen case, Alcebiades intends to annul the sale contract he made with Procolus. He will only succeed in that if he claims that there have been contractual defects which are previously mentioned in the juridical system [in that case, the Brazilian juridical system]. Therefore, the juridical actions can be annulled if one of the following situations is configured: (a) error, (b) deceit, (c) coercion, (d) simulation, (e) fraud against creditors, (f) damage and (g) theory of mental reserve. In other words, the juridical system offers a limited series of a priori data, but all of them are not derived from nature and, thus, in order to be used, all need to be readily chosen and defended, that is to say, they are not demonstrable.
We believe that claiming error is a fragile strategy, because Alcebiades demonstrates, in the deal, the satisfaction of all three qualities that might damage the contract with error, if missing: ability (Procolus and Alcebiades are able), licit object (the owner of the real estate is Alcebiades) and form ruled or not prohibited by law (sales contract is legal). Deceit, simulation and fraud against creditors do not match the case, because Alcebiades could not claim his own turpitude to benefit himself, because this is prohibited by the juridical system. Neither can damage be configured, because it would require that the object of deal were negotiated by a third or less of its market value, besides urgency. Indeed, Alcebiades had urgency, but the value of the loan corresponded to the market value of the real estate. The options left over are coercion and theory of mental reserve which are not ideal hypothesis, but the "least worse" ones. Alcebiades must, then, demonstrate by argumentation that his will was disturbed (something that harms the principle of autonomy of will), under irresistible coercion. Still, if the sale contract was not annulled by coercion, he might claim the right to a "recondite" clause of reverse sale, which might be in the field of contractors' mental reserve, although not explicit in the text of the sale contract.
We may, thus, recognize some specific characteristics of juridical though: A) There is almost never an ideal premise which is perfect for the case. The usage of premises in law is always temerarious, and they can match the case in various possible levels. This also means that each chosen premise depends on a discourse to justify it (rhetorical capacity of persuasion); B) The conduct of Alcebiades will also be defended with rhetoric; it will be necessary to convince the judge (audience) and touch his sensibility in order to demonstrate that Alcebiades has effectively been victim of coercion or mental reserve. The case solution will be moved by the reasonability of parts in debate, by the usage of common sense; C) There will be a confrontation of arguments between Procolus and Alcebiades, because the first will try to resist in property of the real estate. Therefore, the process will be dialectical, because of the discussion involved. It would be, thus, the art of offering and receiving reasons. Let us see how each of the characteristics just mentioned appears in comparison with Aristotelian thought.
A -There is almost never an ideal, apodictic, premise which is perfect for the case. The usage of premises in law is always temerarious, and they can match the case in a higher or lower level, but always in approximate ways. This also means that each chosen premise depends on a discourse to justify its choice. It functions through a type of ratiocination applicable to those areas in which we cannot count on immediately evident principles (this is a specificity of practical reasoning). As affirmed by Eemeren, Grootendrost & Kruiger: "In Aristotle's Topics the term dialectic has a broader meaning. Here, dialectics is the art of reasoning using premises which are not evidently true".
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In law, as well as in all dialectical thought, solutions do not emerge from the posing of premises, but from the posing of the problem. Solution turns around a specific case; it does not appear in a system of previously given arguments. This is precisely the most relevant question in Viehweg's view of Aristotle's Topics. There is certainly a question of choice among the alternatives of solution to the problem-case. Alternatives must be evaluated according to the reasonability of their usage in case, which is their primary orientation.
B -The conduct of Alcebiades will also be defended with rhetoric; it will be necessary to convince the judge (audience) and touch his sensibility in order to demonstrate that Alcebiades has effectively been victim of coercion. The main characteristic of dialectic is to use the art of rationality. Once premises are not an evident truth, its adjustment to the case is the mission of the arguer. It is thus the art of reasoning highlighted by Aristotle's interpreters.
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Reasonability and common sense. Let us explore this idea, taking advantage of what is said by Brunschwig: When Aristotle refers to dialectic, in fact, he always has in mind the practice of reasonable dialogue, the art or argumentation by means of questions and answers, based upon the Socratic model" 11 And also what is said by Eemeren & Grootendorst & Kruiger: "Dialectic was originally the term used to denote a particular argumentative technique in a discussion or debate." 12 . We can see that, when it comes to enthymemes and their degree of certainty, we refer to probability instead of evidence. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have in mind that what is at stake here is not a calculable and statistic probability, but a probability in the qualitative sense. And this is the central idea of dialectics, which also applies to law. Note that Perelman affirms that "what is accepted is what is verisimilar, but we should not confound this verisimilitude with a calculable probability: contrarily, the meaning of the term eulógos, translated as 'generally accepted' or 'acceptable' has a qualitative aspect and is more connected to the term 'reasonable' than too the term 'probable'." 13 C) There will be a confrontation of arguments between Procolus and Alcebiades, because the first will try to resist in property of the real estate. Thus, the process will be dialectical, because of the discussion involved. On dialectics, a previous definition is suitable here. According to Berti, "dialectic derives from dialégesthai, to dialogue, not in the sense of conversation for mutual entertainment, for instance, but in the sense of discussing, with intervention from both sides, contrasting one another. This is a first fundamental difference between apodictic and dialectic: while the former refers to a monologue, the latter is referred to a dialogue". 14 What characterizes juridical thought is exactly the dialectical effort which consists of discussion to choose the arguments that will decide the case. However, there is certainly a confrontation. Concerning this specific point, Eemeren, Grootendrost & Kruiger, while commenting Aristotle's dialectic, state that "In philosophical questions the truth will be revealed more expeditiously if we can find arguments both for and against a certain philosophical point of view. Dialectic is thus the art of arguing for and against." 15 This usage of dialectic, related to "philosophical sciences", is called diaporésai.
Berti describes it as follows:
Remaining in the atmosphere of crossroads, we may say that developing an aporia consists in trying to foresee whereto lead both the directions that appear before us, for instance, looking from a higher viewpoint in order to distinguish whether one of them leads us to inaccessible places or to a dead end. This is exactly the operation which, concerning Topics, we characterize as deduction of the extreme consequences of each one of the opposed hypothesis, leading us to the purpose of seeing which one of them leads to a contradiction and which, contrarily, does not. Thus, the method Aristotle proposes here to metaphysics coincides with the third usage of dialectics, the 'scientific' one, that is to say, again, a dialectic method which we shall denominate, for comfort, 'diaphoretic' procedure.
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In order to guarantee safe results in this diaphoretic method, it is necessary to examine all objections, all opposite argumentations. Comparison with court debates is evident here. To a great extent, dialectic argumentative technique is based upon indirect proofs, like reductio ad impossibile, because argumentation consists in leading the adversary to contradiction. The defense made by Aristotle of the principle of non-contradiction is a paradigmatic example of how a dialectic refutation can achieve the condition of a true demonstration. Aristotle does even mention here a true and proper 'demonstration' (apodéixai), although it is made 'trough refutation' (elenktikôs).
-Comparison of the mentioned cases, Sophia's problem and

Alcebiades' law-case:
In the problem Sophia faces, the solution is deductible because it must necessarily depart from premises found a priori within the system. Therefore, it contains an alternative that derives from a merely formal reasoning, in which there is no need to criticize the content of premises. The solution will be solely demonstrated and not grounded in fundaments 17 . Diversely, in Alcebiades' lawcase, it is necessary to discuss the proposals that are to be taken as premises; it is necessary to characterize Alcebiades' and Procolus' conducts as adequate to the content of the chosen premise. Even though, everything happens in the field of probability, of approximation, and the considered hypothesis is always temerarious. For that reason, the effort of the arguer is needed, his capacity of persuasion. All these elements will depend on the demonstration of reasonability and common sense, in order to convince the audience, and will also involve the poetical art, because this is something that helps in persuasion.
Law is inside the field of rhetoric, for its main goal is to produce consensus, via adhesion of the audience. In Aristotle, rhetoric occupies an intermediate place between poetics and philosophy, in a scale which is ascendant, in the intellectualist sense. Rhetoric is defined as the "faculty of seeing theoretically what, in each case, is capable of generating persuasion" (Art of Rhetoric, book I, chapter 2, I, 1355b). True rhetoric must be a rigorous technique of argumentation. Aristotle's rhetoric is, above all, a rhetoric of proof, or ratiocination, of approximate syllogism.
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Aristotle praises the utility of rhetoric as a technique to dissect a discourse, not rhetoric's power to dominate minds. The function of rhetoric consists, thus, not only in persuasion, but also in seeing the means of persuasion which are pertinent to each case, in recognizing what is and what seems to be convincing (Art of Rhetoric, 1355b, 10-15). Even though it may be dishonestly used, that does not diminish its value. Aristotle has freed rhetoric from the burden of moral. It is necessary to be capable of defending the pro as well as the contra, not to make them equivalent, but in order to understand the adversary mechanism of argumentation and, thus, refute it. Aristotle believes that the true and the just are by nature stronger than their contraries (Art of Rhetoric, 1355a, 37-38). This is also how juridical praxis works.
Ricoeur stresses the broadness of Aristotelian rhetoric, which is related to poetics and to philosophy at the same time. This distinction, which is present inside the art of rhetoric, evokes the distinction between, on one side, the point of view of literature, of oratory, that is to say, of all of those who are worried about the form of discourse, its style and beauty and, on the other side, the strictly argumentative point of view, of all of those worried with the structure and the persuasive or conclusive force of arguments. Ancient rhetoric experts, when they became worried with the phenomenon of adhesion, they only thought of the emotive effect that discourse could generate. In other words, they only cared about style, expression and reception by the listeners. This school tended to concentrate on ornaments, contributing thus to make style more artificial, flowery or bombastic. The approximation to oratory is evident, being those studies included in the old treatises on the theory of elocutio, or theory of stylewhich concentrated mainly on developing stylistic skills to make a speech more beautiful -and on the theory of composition of discourse, or compositio. Together, these two theories formed what Ricoeur called restricted rhetoric. Ricoeur observes that once it distanced itself from its philosophical basis and came closer to poetics (as a stylistic study), rhetoric was a victim of the disregard of occidental tradition: 18 To what concerns this question, it must be taken into account that Aristotle did not exactly oppose emotions to reason. Practical knowledge and the ethic notion of virtue, in Aristotle's view, involve emotions, which need to be educated in order to be rational. Educated emotion would be in harmony with good life and would be essential, as a motivating force of virtue. Without emotions, virtuous actions would be impossible. As synthesized by Nussbaum: "All of this is part of the equipment of the person practical wisdom, part of what practical rationality is. Rationality recognizes truth; the recognition of some ethical truths is impossible without emotion; indeed, certain emotions centrally involve such recognitions." (cf. NUSSBAUM, Martha Craven. Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion. In: RORTY, Amélie Oksenberg. Aristotle's Rhetoric. University of California Press, 1996. pp.303-323, p.316-317). According to Nussbaum's interpretation, Aristotle believes that philosophy, alone, would be incapable of molding souls, being thus necessary, in the beginning, a sort of entrainment of emotions, as a part of the process of education (paideia), which would provide emotions stable and able to philosophize.
